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Abstract
Is there an equilibrium for distributed consensus when all agents except one collude to steer
the decision value towards their preference? If an equilibrium exists, then an n−1 size coalition
cannot do better by deviating from the algorithm, even if it prefers a different decision value. We
show that an equilibrium exists under this condition only if the number of agents in the network
is odd and the decision is binary (among two possible input values). That is, in this framework
we provide a separation between binary and multi-valued consensus. Moreover, the input and
output distribution must be uniform, regardless of the communication model (synchronous or
asynchronous). Furthermore, we define a new problem - Resilient Input Sharing (RIS), and use
it to find an iff condition for the (n−1)-resilient equilibrium for deterministic binary consensus,
essentially showing that an equilibrium for deterministic consensus is equivalent to each agent
learning all the other inputs in some strong sense. Finally, we note that (n − 2)-resilient
equilibrium for binary consensus is possible for any n. The case of (n− 2)-resilient equilibrium
for multi-valued consensus is left open.
∗This work is partially supported by a grant from the Blavatnik Cyber Security Council and the Blavatnik Family
Computer Science Research Fund.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there is a growing interest in distributed algorithms for networks of rational agents
that may deviate from the prescribed algorithm in order to increase their profit [1, 2, 3, 6, 13]. For
example, an agent may have a higher profit if zero is decided in a consensus algorithm, or an agent
may prefer to be (or not to be) the elected leader in a leader election algorithm. The goal is to
design distributed algorithms that reach equilibrium, that is, where no agent can profit by cheating.
In this paper we study the consensus problem in a network of rational agents, in which each
agent has a preferred decision value. We consider (n−1)-resilient equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium
that is resilient to any coalition of up to n − 1 agents that may collude in order to increase their
expected profit (utility). This problem was proposed in [3] and studied also in [4], where the authors
suggest an (n− 1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus in a synchronous ring.
We prove that in any (n−1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus, the output of the agents
must be the XOR of the inputs of all agents. Thus, due to validity, there is no (n − 1)-resilient
equilibrium for binary consensus in even sized networks, and the algorithm in [4] works well only
for odd sized networks. Still, we show that the algorithm in [4] reaches (n− 2)-resilient equilibrium
for binary consensus with uniform input distribution, for any n.
We further show that multi-valued consensus is impossible, i.e., there is no (n − 1)-resilient
equilibrium for multi-valued consensus for r > 2 where r is the number of possible values, thus
surprisingly there is a computational gap between binary and multi-valued consensus in this model.
Note that it was previously shown that in this game theoretic model, leader election is also not
equivalent to consensus [4].
Furthermore, we show that in this model, deterministic binary consensus is equivalent to resilient
input sharing (RIS), a natural problem in distributed computing in which each agent i shares its
input with all other agents in the network (a variant of the knowledge sharing problem defined in
[4]). That is, in any odd sized network with uniform input distribution, any algorithm for RIS can
be transformed into a (n−1)-resilient equilibrium for deterministic binary consensus and vice versa.
Thus, providing a sufficient and necessary condition for (n−1)-resilient equilibrium for deterministic
binary consensus.
1.1 Our Contributions
are as follows:
(§3.1) Any (n−1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus decides on the XOR of all input values.
(§3.2) In any (n− 1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus the input and output distributions
are uniform.
(§3.2.1) The protocol suggested in [4] reaches (n−2)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus with
uniform input distribution, for any n.
(§4) There is no (n− 1)-resilient equilibrium for multi-valued consensus for r > 2 possible inputs.
(§5) Deterministic (n− 1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus in a network exists iff :
1. The network size is odd.
2. The input distribution is uniform.
3. An equilibrium for Resilient Input Sharing (RIS) is possible in the network topology.
The model, notations and some definitions are given in Section 2, and we discuss our results and
further thoughts in Section 6.
1
1.2 Related Work
The secret sharing problem [16] initiated the connection between distributed computing and game
theory. Further works in this line of research considered multiparty communication with Byzantine
and rational agents [1, 8, 11, 12, 15].
In [3], the first distributed protocols for a network of rational agents are presented, specifically
protocols for fair leader election. In [4], the authors continue this line of research by providing
basic building blocks for game theoretic distributed algorithms, namely a wake-up and knowledge
sharing building blocks that are in equilibrium, and equilibria for consensus, renaming, and leader
election are presented using these building blocks. The consensus algorithm in [4] claims to reach
(n − 1)-resilient equilibrium in a ring or complete network, using the knowledge sharing building
block to share the input of all processors in the network, and outputting the XOR of all inputs.
Consensus was further researched in [14], where the authors show that there is no ex-post Nash
equilibrium for rational consensus, and present a Nash equilibrium that tolerates f failures under
some minimal assumptions on the failure pattern. Equilibrium for fair leader election and fair coin
toss are also presented and discussed in [17], where it is shown to be resilient only to coalitions of
sub-linear size, and a modification to the leader election protocol from [3, 4] that is resilient to every
coalition of size Θ(
√
n) is proposed.
In [5], the authors examine the impact of a-priori knowledge of the network size on the equilibrium
of distributed algorithms, assuming the id space is unlimited and thus vulnerable to a Sybil attack
[9]. In [7] the authors remove this assumption and assume the id space is bounded, examining the
relation between the size of the id space and the number of agents in the network in which an
equilibrium is possible.
2 Model
We use the standard message-passing model, where the network is a bidirectional graph G = (V,E)
with |V | = n nodes, each node representing a rational agent, following the model in [2, 3]. We
assume n is a-priori known to all agents, G is 2-vertex-connected, and all agents start the protocol
together, i.e., all agents wake-up at the same time. We can use the Wake-Up [4] building block to
relax this assumption. In Sections 3 and 4 the results apply for both synchronous and asynchronous
communication networks, while Section 5 assumes a synchronous network.
In the consensus problem, each agent i has an id idi and an input Ii ∈ {0, ...r − 1} and must
output a decision Di ∈ {0, ...r − 1,⊥}. The ⊥ output can be output by an agent to abort the
protocol when a deviation by another agent is detected. A protocol achieves consensus if it satisfies
the following [10]:
• Agreement: All agents decide on the same value, ∀i, j : Di = Dj .
• Validity: If v was decided then it was the input of some agent, ∀j∃i : Dj = Ii.
• Termination: Every agent eventually decides, ∀i : Di 6= ⊥.
Definition 2.1 (Protocol Outcome). The outcome of the protocol is determined by the input
and output of all agents. An outcome is legal if it satisfies agreement, validity, and termination,
otherwise the outcome is erroneous.
Considering individual rational agents, each agent i has a utility function Ui over the possible
outcomes of the protocol. The higher the value assigned by Ui to an outcome, the better this
outcome is for i. We assume the utility function Ui of each agent i satisfies Solution Preference [3]:
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Definition 2.2 (Solution Preference). The utility function Ui of any agent i never assigns a higher
utility to an erroneous outcome than to a legal one.
Thus, the Solution Preference guarantees that an agent never has an incentive to sabotage the
protocol, that is, to prefer an outcome that falsifies either agreement or validity, or termination.
However, agents may take risks that might lead to erroneous outcomes if these risks also lead to
a legal outcome which increases their expected utility, that is, if these risks increase the expected
utility that the agent is expected to gain.
An intuitive example for a utility function of an agent I with a preference towards a decision
value of 1 is:
Ui =
{
1 ∃j : Ij = 1 ∧ ∀k : Dk = 1 (1 is decided by all agents)
0 otherwise (0 is decided or erroneous outcome)
All agents are given a protocol at the start of the execution, but any agent may deviate and
execute a different protocol if it increases its expected utility. A protocol is said to reach equilibrium
if no agent can unilaterally increase its expected utility by deviating from the protocol.
Definition 2.3 (Nash Equilibrium1). A protocol Φ is said to reach equilibrium if, for any agent i,
there is no protocol Ψ 6= Φ that i may execute and leads to a higher expected utility for i, assuming
all other agents follow Φ.
2.1 Coalitions
We define a coalition of size t as a set of t rational agents that cooperate to increase the utility
of each agent in t. A protocol that reaches t-resilient equilibrium [3] is resilient to coalitions of
size up to t, that is, no group of t agents or less has an incentive to collude and deviate from the
protocol. We assume coalition members may agree on a deviation from the protocol in advance,
but can communicate only over the network links during the protocol execution.
Definition 2.4 (t-resilient Equilibrium). A protocol Φ is said to reach t-resilient equilibrium if, for
any group of agents C ⊂ V s.t., |C| ≤ t, there is no protocol Ψ(6= Φ) that agents in C may execute
and which would lead to a higher expected utility for each agent in C, assuming all agents not in
C follow Φ.
The same intuitive example for a utility function above holds for a coalition, in which the
coalition has a preference towards a decision value 1.
2.2 Notations
The following notations are used throughout this paper:
• S−i - all possible input vectors of agents in V \ {i}.
• #(b) - the number of agents in V that receive b as input.
• #−i(b) - the number of agents in V \ {i} that receive b as input.
• Ii - the input of agent i.
• Di - the output value decided by agent i at the end of the algorithm.
• r - the number of possible input and output values. For binary consensus: r = 2.
1 Previous works defined equilibrium over each step of the protocol. For convenience, this definition is slightly
different, but it is easy to see that it is equivalent.
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3 Necessary Conditions for (n− 1)-resilient Consensus
Theorem 3.1. The decision of any (n − 1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus must be the
XOR of all inputs, that is, ∀i : Di =
⊕
j∈V
Ij =
∑
j∈V
Ij mod 2
Before we turn to the proof of Theorem 3.1 given in sections 3.1 and 3.2, note that according
to this theorem, if n is even and all inputs are 1 the decision must be 0, contradicting validity and
leading to the following corollary:
Corollary 3.2. There is no (n−1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus for even sized networks
3.1 Output is the XOR of the Inputs
Here we prove Theorem 3.1 based on the following two theorems, that are proved in Section 3.2:
Theorem 3.3. If the distribution over the inputs is not uniform, there is no (n − 1)-resilient
equilibrium for consensus, i.e.: ∀v1, v2 : P [Ii = v1] = P [Ii = v2] = 1r
Theorem 3.4. In any (n − 1)-resilient equilibrium for consensus, given any n − 1 inputs, the
distribution over the possible decision values is uniform: ∀s ∈ S−i, v ∈ {0, ...r−1} : P [Di = v|s] = 1r
Notice that while the proof of theorem 3.1 holds only for binary consensus, theorems 3.3 and 3.4
are correct for multi-valued consensus as well.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We prove that the decision value of binary consensus must be the XOR of
all inputs using induction on #(1), the number of agents in the network whose input value is 1.
In the base case #(1) = 0, the input of all agents is 0. By validity the decision must be 0.
For clarity of exposition we spell out the next case of the induction, #(1) = 1, i.e., the input of
one agent is 1 and of all other n− 1 agents is 0. Assume by contradiction that the probability that
0 is decided in this case is greater than 0, i.e.,
∃i ∈ V : P [Di = 0 | #−i(0) = 0 ∧ Ii = 1] = p > 0
Let s0 be an input configuration for a coalition in which all members of the coalition (i.e., V \ {i})
claim to receive 0 as input, i.e., #−i(1) = 0. Notice that:
P [Di = 0| s0] = P [Ii = 0] · P [Di = 0 | s0 ∧ Ii = 0] + P [Ii = 1] · P [Di = 0 | s0 ∧ Ii = 1]
= P [Ii = 0] · P [Di = 0 | base case ] + P [Ii = 1] · P [Di = 0 | s0 ∧ Ii = 1]
= P [Ii = 0] · 1 + P [Ii = 1] · p
By Theorem 3.3 (and since this is binary consensus) it follows that:
P [Di = 0| s0] = 1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· p > 1
2
Thus, contradicting Theorem 3.4 and proving that, ∀i ∈ V : P [Di = 0 | #−i(0) = 0 ∧ Ii = 1] = 0
Thus if #(1) = 1, the decision value must be 1, proving the first induction step.
By the inductive assumption, ∀#(1) < m the decision value of the consensus must be the XOR
of all inputs, i.e., #(1) mod 2. Let sm−1 be an input configuration for the coalition (V \ {i}) in
which #−i(1) = m− 1, that is, m− 1 members of the coalition claim to receive 1, and the rest 0.
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From Theorem 3.4 (and since this is binary consensus) we get:
P [Di = (m mod 2) | sm−1] = 1
2
If Ii = 0 (which from Theorem 3.3 happens with probability 12) and the coalition acts as if its input
is sm−1, then #(1) = m− 1. By the induction hypothesis, in such a case the decision value of the
consensus must be m− 1 mod 2. To satisfy the equation above it must hold that:
P [Di = (m mod 2) | sm−1 ∧ Ii = 1] = 1
Hence, in case #(1) = m, the decision value must be m mod 2 - the XOR of all inputs.
3.2 Proving Theorems 3.3 and 3.4
While the above proof holds only for binary consensus, the following lemmas and theorems are
correct for multi-valued consensus.
Lemma 3.5. In any (n − 1)-resilient equilibrium for consensus, for any v ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}, given
any n− 1 inputs, the probability to decide v is the same:
∀i ∈ V, s1, s2 ∈ S−i, v : P [Di = v|s1] = P [Di = v|s2]
Proof. Assume by contradiction that ∃i ∈ V, s1, s2 ∈ S−i, v : P [Di = v|s1] < P [Di = v|s2]. A
coalition C = V \ {i} with a preference to decide v, and that receives s1 as input, has an incentive
to deviate and act as if their input is s2, contradicting equilibrium.
Lemma 3.6. In any (n − 1)-resilient equilibrium for consensus, for any input v ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1},
the probability to decide v is the same as the probability to receive v as an input:
∀i ∈ V, s ∈ S−i, v : P [Di = v|s] = P [Ii = v]
Proof. For any v, if all inputs are v then by validity v is decided. For any agent i, let s˜ = (v, . . . , v) ∈
S−i, then due to validity, the probability that v is decided is at least P [Ii = v], i.e., P [Di = v|s˜] ≥
P [Ii = v]. By Lemma 3.5 this is true for any s ∈ S−i. Thus, P [Di = v] ≥ P [Ii = v]. Since∑
v
P [Di = v] = 1 and
∑
v
P [Ii = v] = 1, then: ∀s ∈ S−i, v : P [Di = v|s] = P [Ii = v].
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Assume by contradiction that ∃v1, v2 : P [Ii = v1] > P [Ii = v2].
If all agents receive as input the same value v1, then by validity v1 is decided. Given s =
(v1, . . . , v1) ∈ S−i, the probability that v1 is decided is at least the probability that the input of
agent i is v1, i.e., P [Di = v1|s] ≥ P [Ii = v1].
If n − 1 agents receive v1 as input and one agent receives v2 6= v1 as input the decision must
not be v1 otherwise P [Di = v1|s] > P [Ii = v1] contradicting Lemma 3.6, thus due to validity the
decision must be v2 when n− 1 agents receive v1 and one agent receives v2.
Let s′ = (v2, v1, . . . , v1) ∈ S−i. If agent i receives v1 as input then as stated above v2 is decided,
thus: P [Di = v2|s′] ≥ P [Ii = v1] > P [Ii = v2], contradicting Lemma 3.6.
Thus, the input distribution must be uniform, i.e.: ∀v1, v2 : P [Ii = v1] = P [Ii = v2] = 1r .
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Combining Lemma 3.6 with Theorem 3.3 :
∀s ∈ S−i, v ∈ {0, ...r − 1} : P [Di = v|s] = P [Ii = v] = 1
r
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3.2.1 (n− 2)-resilient Binary Consensus for any n
A binary consensus protocol for any n is presented in [4] combining a leader election algorithm with
a XOR on selected inputs. In Appendix A we prove that this protocol reaches (n − 2)-resilient
equilibrium for binary consensus for any n, when the input distribution is uniform. Note that the
algorithm in [4] does not work in any network topology, but on any network in which Resilient Input
Sharing is possible (see [4] and Section 5).
4 No (n− 1)-resilient Equilibrium for Multi Valued Consensus
Here we discuss multi-valued consensus, where the agreement is between r > 2 possible values rather
than two values. Applying the same logic as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 one can deduce:
Lemma 4.1.
1. ∀i ∈ V, v ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} : P [Di = v|#(0) = n− 1 ∧#(v) = 1] = 1
2. ∀i ∈ V, v ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} : P [Di = 0|#(0) = n− 2 ∧#(v) = 2] = 1
Proof. The proof is the same as the first and second induction steps in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 4.2. There is no (n− 1)-resilient equilibrium for multi-valued consensus for any r > 2
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there is an (n−1)-resilient equilibrium for multi-valued
consensus for some r > 2. Let v, u ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1} s.t. v 6= u. Denote by X any configuration in
which the input of one agent is v, of another is u, and of the rest is 0. In a run of the protocol
starting from X, due to validity the network’s decision value must be either 0 or u or v. We prove
that none of these values can be decided in an equilibrium, reaching a contradiction. Consider some
Agent i and coalition V \ {i}. Define sv and su as follows:
• sv := a configuration in which #−i(0) = n− 2, #−i(v) = 1
• su := a configuration in which #−i(0) = n− 2, #−i(u) = 1
Assume towards a contradiction that P [Di = 0|sv ∧ Ii = u] = p > 0. Notice that (sv ∧ Ii = u) ∈ X.
By point 2 of Lemma 4.1, if Ii = v and the coalition acts as if their input vector is sv, then i
must decide 0. By Theorem 3.3, P [Ii = v] = 1r , therefore, P [Di = 0|sv] ≥ 1r + pr > 1r , contradicting
Lemma 3.6. Thus, in an equilibrium starting from configuration X, the decision value cannot be 0.
Assume towards a contradiction that: P [Di = v|sv ∧ Ii = u] = p > 0.
Notice that from point 1 of Lemma 4.1, if Ii = 0 and the coalition acts as if their input vector
is sv, then i must decide upon v. As before we get: P [Di = v|sv] ≥ 1r + pr > 1r , contradicting
Lemma 3.6. Thus, in an equilibrium starting from configuration X, the decision value cannot be v.
Applying the symmetric claim for u, with a coalition that acts as if their input vector is su, we
get that in an equilibrium starting from configuration X, the decision value cannot be u.
Thus, no value from {0, u, v} can be decided in an (n− 1)-resilient equilibrium for multi-valued
consensus starting with configuration X. Hence, due to validity there is no (n − 1)-resilient
equilibrium for r-valued consensus for any r > 2.
5 Necessary and Sufficient conditions for Deterministic Consensus
The necessary conditions from Section 3 are extended here into necessary and sufficient conditions
for a deterministic (n− 1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus. Deterministic means that the
step of each agent in each round of the algorithm is determined completely by its input and the
6
Figure 1: Messages sent by agent A at round 0. RA is a random number chosen by A.
history of messages it has received up until the current round. In Appendix C some difficulties in
trying to extend our proof to non-deterministic algorithms are provided. For the sufficient condition,
a new problem - Resilient Input Sharing (RIS), a variant of knowledge sharing [4], is introduced.
Theorem 5.1. A deterministic (n− 1)-resilient equilibrium for consensus exists iff:
1. n is odd
2. The input distribution is uniform
3. There exists an algorithm for deterministic RIS (defined below).
5.1 The Resilient Input Sharing Problem
In the RIS problem, agents in V share their binary inputs while each agent i assumes V \ {i}
are in a coalition. Intuitively, each agent requires all other agents to commit their inputs before
or simultaneously to them learning about its input. The motivation for this requirement is that
we consider problems in which (1) all agents compute the same function on the inputs, and (2) if
any one input is unknown, then any output in the range of the function is still equally possible
[4, 5]. Therefore the above requirement ensures that the coalition cannot affect the computation
after learning the remaining (honest) agent’s input, which is necessary for the computation to reach
(n− 1)-resilient equilibrium. We use the following definitions:
• Ktj- Agent j’s knowledge at the beginning of round t, including any information the coalition
could have shared with it.
• Agent j is an i-knower(t)- if at the beginning of round t it can make a ’good’ guess about Ii,
i.e., ∃b ∈ {0, 1} : P [Ii = b|Ktj ] > P [Ii = b]
• Know(i, t) - the group of all i-knowers at the beginning of round t. In a RIS algorithm,
Know(i, 0) = ∅ and Know(i,∞) = V \ {i}
Consider for example the network in Figure 1. At Round 0, A sends two different messages,
whose XOR is its input, to B and C. At Round 1, B and C can pass these messages to D, even if
this would not happen in a correct run. Thus: Know(A, 2) = {D}, and Know(A, 3) = {B,C,D}.
5.1.1 The RIS Problem
A solution to the RIS problem satisfies the following conditions:
1. Termination - the algorithm must eventually terminate.
2. Input-sharing - at termination, each agent knows the inputs of all other agents.
3. Resilient - at any round t, Agent i does not receive new information from agents inKnow(i, t).
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Notice: in a consensus protocol, if j is an i-knower(t), and j can still influence the output
at round t, then the protocol is not an (n − 1)-resilient equilibrium. Thus, in an (n − 1)-resilient
equilibrium for consensus, no new information can be sent to i from any i-knower(t) at round t.
5.2 The effect of messages in a XOR computation
We prove that at the end of a distributed XOR computing algorithm, if an agent is given all the
chains of messages that have affected its run, it can infer the input of every other agent (Theorem
5.5). This result applies for both deterministic and non-deterministic XOR algorithms.
Remark 1: In synchronous networks, an agent can pass information to its neighbor through a
silent round. Hereafter, every protocol in which informative silent rounds (explained in the proof of
Lemma 5.6 and defined formally in Appendix B) occur is altered, and a special message EMPTY
is sent instead on the corresponding link.
Remark 2: Hereafter, we consider networks in which every agent knows the topology of the
network before the algorithm starts. Otherwise, the coalition could always cheat and choose a
topology in which RIS is not possible (for example, 1-connected topology)
Definition 5.2 (Messages recipient). Let R be a run of the protocol and C ⊆ V a group of agents.
Recv(C, t,R) = {i ∈ V |i received a message from C in round t of R}
Definition 5.3 (Agents affected by a message). In a run R, let m be a message sent at round tm
to dstm = agent j from srcm. Then:
• Aff(m,R,tm) = {j} - Agent j is directly affected by m.
• ∀k > 0 : Aff(m,R,tm+k) = Aff(m,R,tm+k−1) ∪ Recv(Aff(m,R,tm+k−1),R,tm+k) - Agents that
were recursively affected by m.
Aff(m,R,t) illustrates that a message may affect more than just its recipient; Its potential effect
propagates through the network, reaching different agents through other messages.
Definition 5.4 (All the (chains of) messages that have an effect on agent i in run R).
• Aff(i,R) = { < m, tm, srcm, dstm >, m sent in R |i ∈ Aff(m,R,Tend)} (R terminates at Tend)
Theorem 5.5 (The encoding of all inputs). Let R be a run of a distributed XOR computing
algorithm. Let i, j ∈ V , Agent i can compute Ij from the following information:
1. Ii - its input.
2. Decision value i.e., the XOR of all inputs.
3. Aff(i,R) - all the messages in R that have an effect on Agent i.
To prove Theorem 5.5, assume the following base case is correct (to be proved in the sequel):
Lemma 5.6. Theorem 5.5 is correct for a network of size 3, V = {i, j, k}.
Proof of Theorem 5.5. Let G = (V,E) be a network where n > 3, such that i, j ∈ V . Create a new
network G′ in which agents i and j are as in G, but all other agents in V \ {i, j} are clustered into
one ’virtual’ agent k. A distributed XOR algorithm for G′ is:
• Agent k chooses n− 2 bits such that the XOR of these bits is its Ik.
• Agents i and j behave in G′ as if they were in G, explicitly attaching to each message the id
of its destination, while k emulates the behavior of the other n− 2 agents in V , attaching to
each message the id of its source.
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Let IRi and D
R
i be the input and output of i in run R. For any run R of the algorithm in G, ∃R′ - a
run of the algorithm in G′ s.t.,: (1) IRi =I
R′
i , I
R
j =I
R′
j , (2) D
R
i =D
R′
i and (3) Aff(i,R) ⊇ Aff(i,R′).
From lemma 5.6 we know that from DR′i , I
R′
i and Aff(i,R′), I
′
j can be computed. Therefore:
∀i 6= j ∈ V : - DRi , IRi and Aff(i,R) are enough to compute IRj .
Proof of 5.6. V = {i, j, k}. Assume towards a contradiction that ∃R1, R2, two runs of the algorithm
such that
1. IR1i = I
R2
i - Agent i’s inputs in R1 and R2 are the same.
2.
⊕
l∈V I
R1
l =
⊕
l∈V I
R2
l - The decision value is the same in both R1 and R2.
3. Aff(i,R1) = Aff(i,R2) - Exactly the same set of messages affect i in both runs.
4. IR1j 6= IR2j - Agent j’s input in R1 is different than in R2.
Clearly from 1, 2, and 4 it must be that IR1k 6= IR2k .
Towards a contradiction we construct run R3, in which i’s and k’s inputs are the same as in R1
and j’s input is the same as in R2, but the decision value (XOR) in R3 is the same as in R1.
In R3, agents i and k start to perform their steps according to R1 until the first round in which
i or k receive a message that either does not receive in that round in R1. Agent j behaves the same
as in R2, until the first round, denoted round T − 1, in which it receives a message m it does not
receive in that round in R2. Notice that it is legal for all agents to act this way in round 0. Further,
if i and k can continue according to R1 and j can continue according to R2 until termination, then
i outputs the same value as it would in R1, which is incorrect for R3.
Observation 1 From round T until termination j cannot send messages to i in either R1 or R2
or otherwise, m’s effect would propagate to i, causing - Aff(i,R1) 6= Aff(i,R2), contradicting
point 3 of the assumptions.
Observation 2 Similarly from round T until termination, j cannot send messages to i in R3 or
otherwise, let t ≥ T be the first round (after T ) of R3 in which j sends a message to i. In R1
- j does not send a message to i in round t (see Observation 1). This means that this silent
round t of R1 between j and i is informative (it tells i that the run is R1/R2 and not R3).
Since we do not allow informative silent rounds (see Remark 1), we reach a contradiction.
Notice that by point 3 in the assumptions, after T j cannot even communicate with i through k,
since m’s effect would propagate to i through k. From the two observations above, from round T of
R3, j cannot communicate with i, and from i’s perspective, j is running R1. The same logic applies
for k - the first round in which it is illegal for k to act according to R1, is a round after which k
cannot send messages to i (even not through j). Thus i’s experience throughout R3 is the same as
in R1, resulting in i making an incorrect output. Contradiction.
5.3 Deterministic (n− 1)-resilient Consensus implies RIS, completing the proof
In a deterministic synchronous binary consensus protocol, in which all agents start at the same
round, for each input vector the run of the algorithm is fully determined.
Let us look at a network running some deterministic binary consensus, with agent i ∈ V and
coalition V \ {i}. Intuitively, agents in the coalition can choose in advance an input vector to be
used in the algorithm. Thus, from the coalition’s perspective, there can be only two possible runs -
R0 in which Ii = 0, and R1 in which Ii = 1. For each agent in the coalition, there is the first round
in which R0 and R1 differ, at that point this agent knows Ii. Thus, each agent in the coalition is
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in one of two states - knows nothing about Ii or knows Ii, this is in contrast to non-deterministic
algorithms, see for example Figure 1.
Below we transform any deterministic (n − 1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus into a
deterministic RIS. In Appendix C the difficulties in the non-deterministic case are explained.
Theorem 5.7. If there exists a deterministic (n− 1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus, A
on network G = (V,E) then there exists an algorithm A˜ for RIS, on G.
Proof. In A˜, each agent i runs A with the following modifications:
• For each message m that i receives, i appends < m, srcm, dstm, tm > to a local buffer B of
messages that has affected it.
• Agent i appends B to each message it sends.
• Agent i adds to B all the information piggy-bagged on incoming messages.
In this new algorithm A˜, every message propagates in the network, reaching all the agents it affects.
By the end of the algorithm, the buffer maintained by agent i contains Aff(i,R), where R is the
run of the original consensus protocol A. By theorem 3.1, A is a XOR computing protocol, and by
theorem 5.5, i’s buffer contains enough information to infer all inputs. Thus A˜ is an RIS protocol.
It remains to prove that A˜ is resilient. An input sharing protocol is resilient (Subsection 5.1)
if at any round t, i does not receive new information from agents in Know(i, t). As stated before,
this demand applies for (n − 1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus as well. Thus, to show
that A˜ is resilient, it is enough to show that ∀i ∈ V :
• In each round t of A˜, i receives messages from the same neighbors it receives from in A
• In each round t of A˜, ∀j 6= i: j ∈ Know(i, t) in A˜ =⇒ j ∈ Know(i, t) in A
The first point is immediate from the construction of A˜. For the second point - observe some agent
j at round t of A, which is not an i-knower in A. For j to become an i-knower(t) in A˜, the coalition
must send j enough information by t for it to make a ’good’ guess about Ii. There are two kind of
paths in G by which the coalition can send information to j - paths that do not pass through i, and
paths that do.
Through paths not including i, the coalition can pass information in the same pace for both A
and A˜. Since j /∈ Know(i, t) in A, using these paths alone is not enough to make j an i-knower(t) in
A˜. Regarding paths that include i - as argued in the beginning of this subsection, in a deterministic
(n− 1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus, if a member of the coalition has any information
about Ii, then that member knows Ii. Therefor, in A, i should not receive messages from members
of Know(i, t) at round t. Thus if the coalition has information it wants to pass to j, it cannot do
so using paths including agent i, since i does not accept and propagate messages from i-knowers.
To conclude, if j is an i-knower in A˜, j is an i-knower in A. Since A is (n− 1)-resilient equilibrium
for consensus, A˜ is resilient as well.
5.3.1 Completing the proof, necessary and sufficient conditions for deterministic Consensus
Proof of Theorem 5.1⇐. Assume that the 3 conditions are realized, and let us suggest a simple
(n − 1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus: run the RIS algorithm and output the XOR of
all inputs. Since the RIS algorithm is resilient, no coalition has an incentive to cheat.
Proof of Theorem 5.1⇒. Assume that (n − 1)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus exists.
By 3.2 and 3.3, n is odd and the input distribution is uniform. By theorem 5.7, RIS is possible.
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6 Discussion
Surprisingly, while there is an equilibrium for binary consensus resilient to coalitions of n−1 agents,
no such equilibrium exists for multi valued consensus. This is the first model we know of in which
there is a separation between binary and multi valued consensus. Intuitively, this is because a
coalition with a preference towards v has an incentive to cheat and act as if the input of all agents
in the coalition is v, thus lowering the number of possible decision values (due to validity) to two
values, at most. Consider for example the standard bit-by-bit reduction from binary to multi
valued consensus, the probability to decide v is now at least 12 instead of
1
r , since the decision value
is determined by the decision on the first bit of the coalition input that differs from the input of
the honest agent. We conjecture that this intuition holds even for smaller coalitions, up to a single
cheater. The results in §3 and §4 hold regardless of the network topology, scheduling models, or
cryptographic solutions, as they are based solely on the input values and utility of the agents.
Furthermore, we present necessary and sufficient conditions for (n− 1)-resilient equilibrium for
binary deterministic consensus using the resilient input sharing (RIS) problem. This in fact means
that an agent cannot hide its input from the rest of the network in any (n− 1)-resilient equilibrium
protocol that computes XOR, i.e., even though we only compute the XOR of inputs, at the end of
the protocol all agents can deduce the input values of all other agents.
There are several open directions for research:
• Extending the equivalence result to non-deterministic consensus and RIS.
• Can binary consensus be solved without the conditions of even size and uniform input for
coalitions of a smaller size, such as n− 2 or n2 ?
• Does an equilibrium for multi-valued consensus exist for coalitions of size n− 2 or less?
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A (n− 2)-resilient Consensus for Even n
In [4] the authors provide a different protocol for even and odd size networks. Here we prove that
the protocol suggested for binary consensus when n is even, provides (n − 2)-resilient equilibrium
for binary consensus. The protocol assumes the existence of an (n − 2)-resilient equilibrium for
knowledge-sharing in order to perform an (n − 2)-resilient equilibrium for leader election (notice
that in [17], it is shown that in an asynchronous ring, the leader election algorithm of [4] is not
resilient to coalitions of size O(
√
n)). Further, the protocol assumes each agent has a unique id, and
all agents start the protocol at the same round.
Algorithm 1 [4] Protocol for (n− 2)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus
for each agent i:
1. Let ri = random(1, ..., n)
2. Execute Knowledge sharing [4] to learn K = {< I1, r1, id1 >, ... < In, rn, idn >}
3. For any k, if Ik /∈ {0, 1} or rk /∈ {1, ..., n}, or ∃j such that idj = idk, set Di =⊥ and terminate
4. Calculate L = (
∑n
k=1 rk) mod n, set leader to be the L-th ranked id
5. Set Di =
⊕
k∈{1,...,n}
idk 6=leader
Ik and terminate
Essentially, the protocol suggested in [4] when n is even, performs input sharing in parallel to
leader election, then outputs the XOR of all inputs without the leader’s input. It is easy to see that
this protocol for consensus satisfies agreement, validity, and termination.
For the rest of this section, let V be the agents in a network of even size, executing the protocol
in Algorithm 1, with coalition C = V \ {i, j}. Also, we assume the input distribution is uniform,
i.e., ∀i ∈ V : P [Ii = 0] = P [Ii = 1] = 12 .
Theorem A.1. Algorithm 1 is an (n− 2)-resilient-equilibrium for binary consensus.
Proof of Theorem A.1 follows after the following observation and lemmas:
If no agent deviates from the protocol in Algorithm 1, then the decision value of the consensus
is uniformly distributed. Therefore, if after the coalition C deviates, the probability to decide a
value preferred by C is still ≤ 1/2, C has no incentive to cheat.
Lemma A.2. If at the end of the knowledge sharing step, i learns the true value of Ij (or vice
versa), C has no incentive to deviated from the protocol.
Proof. In this case at least one of the inputs of agents i and j is not omitted from the XOR performed
by i or/and j. Since the coalition has no influence on these inputs, which are uniformly distributed,
the result of the XOR is also uniformly distributed, and they have no incentive to cheat.
Following Observation A.0 and Lemma A.2 it remains to consider the case in which the coalition
can cheat each of i and j about the input, or id, and/or random value selected in step 1, of the
other.
Lemma A.3. C has no incentive to share with i and j two sets of ids and random values that
disagree.
Proof. Assume C has a preference towards v. Denote by X the case in which the coalition forced i
and j to elect two different leaders. Notice that to achieve this the coalition must provide i and j
two different sets of ids and random values for all the other agents.
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In case X the decision value of i is independent of the decision value of j. Following [4] ∀k, l ∈
V : P [leaderk = l] =
1
n . Thus,
∀k ∈ {i, j} : P [leaderk 6= k] = n− 1
n
If i does not elect itself as leader, then (based of the uniform input distribution) Di = v with
probability 12 . Hence:
P [Di = v|X] = P [leaderi 6= i|X] · 1
2
+ P [leaderi = i|X] · P [Di = v|X ∧ leaderi = i]
≤ P [leaderi 6= i|X] · 1
2
+
1
n
=
n− 1
2n
+
1
n
=
n + 1
2n
The same goes for agent j. Since the decision of i is independent of the decision of j (by solution
preference, the coalition succeeds only if Di = Dj = v):
∀n > 2 : P [Di = v ∧Dj = v|X] = P [Di = v|X] · P [Dj = v|X] ≤ (n + 1
2n
)
2
<
1
2
Since the probability to decide v when executing the protocol in Algorithm 1 with no deviation is
1
2 , there is no incentive for C to share different ids or random values with i than it shares with j
(and vice versa).
Lemma A.4. C has no incentive to share a set of input values with i and a set with j, that disagree.
Proof. Assume C has a preference towards v, and denote by Y the case in which the coalition
provides a set of input values with i and a set with j, that disagree. Like in the previous proof,
the decision values of i and j are independent. By A.3, both agents i and j elect the same leader,
hence that at least one of them is not elected. W.l.o.g, i is not the leader. When i calculates
the XOR (step 5), Ii is not omitted from the calculation. Since the set of inputs provided to i is
independent for Ii (provided by knowledge-sharing being resilient), and since C does not know in
advance Ii, which is uniformly distributed, the result of the XOR is uniformly distributed. I.e.:
P [Di = v|Y ] = 12 . Since the probability to reach consensus on v when running Algorithm 1 with no
deviation is 12 , there is no incentive for C to share different input values with i, than it shares with
j.
Proof of Theorem A.1. From lemmas A.2, A.3 and A.4, we know that, in any run of the algorithm,
both i and j obtain the same knowledge K. Since the decision value is uniformly distributed in a
correct run, then for any legal knowledge sharing K: P [Di = 0] = P [Di = 1] = 12 . This means that
C has no incentive to choose in advance either a specific set of random values or input values or
ids.
B Informative Silent Rounds and Informative Messages
For this section, let R be a run of a distributed XOR algorithm A in network G = (V,E).
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Definition B.1 (Link experiences). For any Agent i ∈ V at any round t, for all (i, j) ∈ E define
the incoming link experience of i to be:
ILE(i, j, t) =
{
m (j sends message m to i at round t)
silence (j does not send any message to i at round t)
Similarly, define the outgoing link experience of i with j at round t to be:
OLE(i, j, t) =
{
m (i sends message m to j at round t)
silence (i does not send any message to j at round t)
Definition B.2 (Round of an agent). For i ∈ V at round t:
• Ii := Agent i’s input.
• in(i, t) := All incoming link experiences i has with its neighbors at round t.
• out(i, t) := All outgoing link experiences i has with its neighbors at round t.
• D(i, t) ∈ {0, 1, ?} := The decision value of i. As long as t is not the final round, D(i, t) =?
• round(i, t) =< Ii, in(i, t), out(i, t), D(i, t) > := Round t from agent i’s perspective
Definition B.3 (Run of an agent). For i ∈ V , define R(i) to be the projection of R on i:
R(i) :=< round(i, 0), round(i, 1), ...round(i, Tend) >
Definition B.4 (Prefix and suffix of a run). For i ∈ V :
R(i)0...t :=< round(i, 0), round(i, 1), ...round(i, t) >
I.e. the prefix of R(i) up to round t. Each prefix of a run has a set of possible legal suffixes of the
form:
S(i)t+1... :=< round(i, t + 1), round(i, t + 2), ... >
Definition B.5 (Informative link experience). Intuitively, informative link experiences are ILE
after which i’s execution may be altered. Let i, j ∈ V . Denote e1 to be a legal ILE that i has at
round t of R with j. e1 is informative if there exists:
• e2 := Another ILE that i has with j at round t (e1 6= e2)
• out := A set of outgoing link experiences i had with its neighbors at round t
• in := A set of incoming link experiences i had with its neighbors at round t not including j.
• D := A decision value.
Such that the following holds:
1. Both < Ii, in
⋃{e1}, out, D > and < Ii, in⋃{e2}, out, D > are legal rounds for agent i in
a run of A with prefix R(i)0...t−1
2. ∃ S(i)t+1... - a suffix of i’s run, such that:
P [S(i)t+1... | R(i)0...t−1∧ < Ii, in
⋃
{e1}, out, D >] 6=
P [S(i)t+1... | R(i)0...t−1∧ < Ii, in
⋃
{e2}, out, D >]
Definition B.6 (Informative silent round). In Subsection 5.2, an informative silent round is actually
an incoming link experience i has with j at round t, such that:
1. ILE(i, j, t) = silence
2. ILE(i, j, t) is informative
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C Difficulties in extending Theorem 5.7 to Non Deterministic Case
Figure 2: A snippet of agents A and C’s knowledge regarding IB in a non-deterministic XOR
computing algorithm. RB is a random number chosen by B.
Figure 2 depicts a counter example in a non-deterministic algorithm to the construction in Theorem 5.7.
A and C cannot make a good guess regarding IB on their own. If however, they were able to combine
the information they have acquired, they would become B-knowers. In the original algorithm, B can
still receive (send) messages from (to) A and C (they are not B-knowers). Applying the construction
in Theorem 5.7 on this non-deterministic algorithm, agent A would have been able to pass C its
array of messages, and B would have to let it pass through, thus creating an A-C ’shortcut’ through
B.
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